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LEGAL SHORTS

RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I.

STATE V. KINGMAN1

In State v. Kingman, the Montana Supreme Court articulated the high
standard necessary to establish juror prejudice and reconciled the state’s
approach with that of the federal courts on this issue. The Court held that
the defendant, Miles Kingman (“Kingman”), failed to show that pre-trial
media coverage of his crimes inherently prejudiced an entire pool of potential jurors.2 Kingman could not establish that the media displaced the judicial process and predetermined the community’s decision regarding his
guilt or innocence.3 Accordingly, the Court determined that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kingman’s motion for a change
of venue on both United States and Montana constitutional grounds.4
This case arose from a violent exchange between Kingman and Paul
Overby (“Overby”) following a night of drinking at the Scoop Bar in Bozeman, Montana.5 During the early morning hours of September 17, 2008,
Kingman and his companion, Ryan Dibert (“Dibert”), left the bar and proceeded to push another patron’s motor scooter around the bar’s parking lot.6
Overby recognized the scooter as belonging to a friend and confronted
Kingman and Dibert.7 The interaction escalated into a heated argument,
which ended after Kingman punched Overby in the face between 15 and 20
times.8 As a result, Overby sustained life-threatening head trauma, includ1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

State v. Kingman, 264 P.3d 1104 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1107.
Id.
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ing facial lacerations and skull fractures.9 His extensive injuries required
reconstructive surgery, a month-long hospital stay, and an additional month
of rehabilitation.10
Following the altercation, Kingman fled to his home where he proceeded to call his friend Zane to discuss the fight.11 Unable to reach Zane,
Kingman left a voicemail message boasting that he “beat this guy to death”
and that “it feels so good.”12 Kingman later obtained a ride to Zane’s house
from another friend, Katelin, who noticed that Kingman was covered in
blood and acting strangely.13 She called the police, and Kingman was arrested shortly thereafter.14 The State charged Kingman with attempted deliberate homicide.15 A three-day jury trial commenced on November 12,
2009.16
Prior to trial, local media including newspapers, television, and radio,
reported on the factual details of the incident and the charges levied against
Kingman.17 Specifically, a local newspaper ran nine articles, and the evening news aired nine broadcasts.18 Most of the coverage occurred within
the first few weeks following the altercation; however, sporadic coverage
continued through 2008 and early 2009.19 Additionally, members of the
community conducted various publicized fundraising activities on Overby’s
behalf.20 His friends placed donation jars in local businesses, set up a bank
fund, and hosted a benefit in Big Sky, Montana.21
On June 29, 2009, Kingman moved for a change of venue due to the
inflammatory nature of the media coverage in the Gallatin County area and
the prevailing prejudice in the community.22 Kingman argued that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article II, §§ 17 and 24 of the Montana Constitution required a change in
venue to guarantee a fair and impartial trial.23 To resolve this issue, the
district court sent questionnaires to 150 prospective jurors designed to assess the level of prejudice against Kingman by the media.24 Ninety-six ju9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1107–1108.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id.
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1108.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rors admitted that they had seen, read, or heard about the case, but 108
jurors responded that they had not formed an opinion that would affect their
ability to serve as jurors.25 Based on these responses, the district court concluded that the pretrial publicity “had not been inflammatory” and that
Kingman failed to show that the jurors would not set aside what they had
heard and decide his guilt impartially.26 Kingman was eventually convicted
of aggravated assault and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.27
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court addressed whether Kingman’s
motion to change venue should have been granted in response to the prejudicial effect of the pretrial publicity.28 The Court’s analysis focused primarily on reconciling the change of venue approaches utilized under the
United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution.29
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee “‘a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’”30 A
federal court must transfer a proceeding to a different district if so much
prejudice exists against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.31 Likewise, Article II, §§ 17 and 24 of the Montana Constitution assure that the defendant receives a “fair trial by an impartial jury.”32
Under Montana law, if such prejudice exists that a fair trial cannot be obtained, the court is required to “transfer the cause to another county, direct
that a jury be selected from another county, or take any other action designed to ensure that a fair trial may be had.”33 The common prerequisite
for obtaining a change of venue under both the federal and Montana systems is that “there is such prejudice as will prevent a fair and impartial trial
in the current venue.”34
The Court then explained that federal courts recognize two types of
prejudice: presumed prejudice and actual prejudice.35 Presumed prejudice
exists where “‘pretrial publicity is so pervasive and prejudicial that [the
district court] cannot expect to find an unbiased jury pool in the community.’”36 To meet this standard, publicity must be both “extensive and sensational.”37 Only in rare situations where publicity “in essence displace[s]
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1109.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1109–1110.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 507 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1110 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a)).
Id.
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46–13–203 (2011)).
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id. at 1111 (quoting House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1111.
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the judicial process” will a court find presumed prejudice.38 In contrast,
actual prejudice exists “when voir dire reveals that the jury pool harbors
actual partiality or hostility against the defendant.”39 Mere knowledge of a
case is insufficient to support a finding of actual prejudice, since intelligent
jurors will almost always be informed of significant events in their communities.40
Next, the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of Montana cases that
decided issues of prejudice similar to the federal approach. The Court ultimately concluded, pursuant to Montana precedent and federal law, that it
will only presume prejudice “in extreme situations where there are such
pervasive and strong passions of anger, hatred, indignation, revulsion, and
upset in the community” that jurors’ claims of impartiality cannot be
trusted.41 The Court provided several examples from Montana cases. In
State ex rel. Coburn v. Bennett, community members marching on the
courthouse in conjunction with the printing of biased newspaper articles
constituted prejudice.42 In State v. Spotted Hawk, numerous citizens vowing to take the law into their own hands if the defendant was acquitted
established prejudice.43 And in State v. Dryman, prejudice was found
where the district court judge, sheriff, and Prison Commission all agreed
that the defendant “might have been lynched” in response to inflammatory
media coverage.44 Factors to consider in determining presumed prejudice
include the size of the community, the community’s sentiment, the nature of
the publicity, the amount of time that has elapsed between the crime and the
trial, and whether jurors’ actions ran counter to a presumption of
prejudice.45
On the other hand, in Montana, actual prejudice will only be found
where jurors “actually could not set aside what they have heard or read in
the media and decide the defendant’s guilt impartially and based solely on
the evidence admitted at trial.”46 In most cases, voir dire will serve as the
primary method of proving that potential jurors are incapable of rendering a
fair verdict.47
Applying these standards to Kingman’s constitutional claims, the
Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1115.
State ex rel. Coburn v. Bennett, 655 P.2d 502, 503–507 (Mont. 1982).
State v. Spotted Hawk, 55 P. 1026, 1031–1032 (Mont. 1899).
State v. Dryman, 269 P.2d 796, 797–800 (Mont. 1954).
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1118.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
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Kingman’s motion for a change of venue.48 The Court rejected Kingman’s
argument that media reports discussing the altercation with Overby and his
voicemail confession inherently biased jurors against him.49 None of the
media reports cited by Kingman went “beyond an objective dissemination
of information, nor [did] they inflame an already angry populace.”50 The
details of Kingman’s voicemail confession received only passing discussion
on very few occasions, long before the start of the trial.51 The Court also
found insufficient evidence to support Kingman’s argument that the fundraising efforts instigated by Overby’s friends created a presumption of
“communitywide antipathy toward Kingman.”52 Additionally, the results
of the questionnaire submitted to potential jurors belied a “presumption that
the entire jury pool was corrupted.”53 In short, Kingman failed to show that
the population of Gallatin County was so incensed as to preclude a fair
trial.54
Montana practitioners should be aware of the extremely high bar that
must be met in order to establish juror prejudice. Absent a showing of “a
circus atmosphere or lynch mob mentality,”55 the Court will not presume
that the jury pool of an entire community is incapable of rendering an impartial decision. And where voir dire reveals that most jurors are not biased
against a defendant, the Court will not find that actual prejudice exists.
—Mac Bloom
II.

PATCH V. HILLERICH & BRADSBY CO.56

In Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., the Montana Supreme Court held
that a pitcher killed by a baseball was a “user” or “consumer” of the baseball bat that gave the lethal ball an unusually high exit speed.57 The Court
also affirmed the denial of an assumption-of-risk defense offered by the
defendant baseball bat manufacturer.58 Finally, the Court reiterated its approval of a flexible standard of proof for causation in failure-to-warn
cases.59
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1119–1120.
Id. at 1119.
Kingman, 264 P.3d at 1120–1121.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 390.
Id.
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On July 25, 2003, eighteen-year-old Brandon Patch (“Brandon”) died
from a blow to the head from a baseball hit by one of manufacturer Hillerich & Bradsby’s (“H & B”) model CB 13 aluminum bats during an American Legion baseball game.60 Some studies conclude that pitchers need 0.4
seconds to react to a batted ball; analysis of a sound recording of the game
indicated that Brandon only had 0.376 seconds.61 The CB 13 bat caused a
significant increase in the velocity of the ball compared to other bats, leaving less time for Brandon to react.
Brandon’s parents, individually and as representatives of their child’s
estate, filed a strict products liability lawsuit against H & B for survivorship
and wrongful death damages.62 They asserted various products liability
claims, including failure-to-warn and manufacturing and design defects.63
The district court granted summary judgment on the manufacturing defect
claim but allowed the design defect and failure-to-warn claims to proceed to
trial.64 The jury rejected the design defect claim but concluded that the bat
was in a defective condition because of H & B’s failure to warn baseball
players of the enhanced risks associated with the CB 13 bat.65 At the conclusion of the trial, the district court denied H & B’s Rule 50(b) motion for
judgment as a matter of law.66 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $850,000 in
damages, and H & B appealed.67
The Montana Supreme Court first concluded that the district court did
not err in denying H & B’s summary judgment motion on the failure-towarn claim.68 Although the lower court and both parties referred to Brandon as a bystander, the Court did not directly do so, instead reasoning that
Brandon was a user or consumer as defined by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A.69 The Court concluded that H & B had construed the terms
“user” and “consumer” too narrowly.70 Because the Court deemed Brandon
a user or consumer, the Court avoided the central conflict of the lower
court: whether a failure-to-warn claim is available to bystanders.71
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, adopted as Montana’s
strict products liability law in Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales,72
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 386.
Id. at n. 2
Patch, 257 P.3d at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386–387.
Id. at 386.
Patch, 257 P.3d at 388.
Id. at 387 n. 3.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 387.
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973).
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broadly defines “consumer” and “user.”73 These terms may include persons
who did not actually purchase or use a product if such persons are sufficiently exposed to potential harm.74 The Court explained that a “warning of
the bat’s risks to only the batter standing at the plate inadequately communicates the potential risk of harm posed by the bat’s increased exit
speed.”75 The Court explained that “all of the players, including Brandon,
were users or consumers placed at risk by the increased exit speed caused
by H & B’s bat.”76 Justice Wheat, who authored the Court’s opinion, later
wrote that despite the use of the term “bystander” in the jury instructions,
“[t]he jury obviously determined Brandon was a user of the product.”77
The Court rejected H & B’s argument that warning those who are not
the immediate user or consumer of the product was “unworkable.”78 Pointing to Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp.,79 where the Court rejected the manufacturer’s argument that a warning was not feasible after exposure to a toxic
fungicide injured employees who had not used or consumed the product,
the Court similarly held that the workability of a warning is a proper question for the jury.80
The Court also rejected H & B’s argument that a warning on the bat
would not have prevented Brandon’s death because he would not have seen,
read, and heeded such a warning.81 The Court dismissed H & B’s assumption that effective warnings must be placed directly on the bat.82 Warnings
are not limited to placement on the product itself.83 The Court suggested
several alternatives, including oral warnings, releases to be read and signed,
and warnings placed in advertisements, posters, and media releases.84
Next, the Court affirmed the order in limine denying H & B’s assumption-of-the-risk defense.85 As the Court has previously explained, “the [assumption-of-the-risk] defense is inapplicable as a matter of law without evidence the victim actually knew he or she would suffer serious injury or
death . . . .”86 The defense presented no such evidence and thus failed to
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Patch, 257 P.3d at 387; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. l (1965).
Patch, 257 P.3d at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 388.
Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805, 807–808, 810 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1993).
Patch, 257 P.3d at 388–389.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Patch, 257 P.3d at 390 (citing Lutz v. Natl. Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455, 461–462 (Mont. 1994)).
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meet the burden of proof that Brandon knew of the enhanced risks of the
CB 13 bat.87
H & B also challenged the denial of its Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of causation.88 The defense argued
that, for a plaintiff to prove the causation element after Riley v. American
Honda Motor Co.,89 plaintiffs must “present evidence that a warning would
have altered their conduct.”90
Once again, the Court rejected H & B’s argument.91 The Court reiterated its approval of a flexible standard of proof for causation in products
liability cases.92 Riley established one valid means of proving causation,
not the only way to do so.93 Other factors can influence the plaintiff’s requisite standard of proof, including the death or inability of a plaintiff to
testify.94 After pointing out the injustice of requiring a plaintiff to prove
what a deceased person would have done if warned, the Court accepted
testimony that Brandon followed guidelines and that his team began using
wooden bats after his death as sufficient to permit an inference that Brandon would have heeded a warning.95 Because that inference could sufficiently prove causation, the issue of whether the failure to warn of the potential risks associated with the bat caused the injury correctly went to the
jury.96
Justice Rice concurred with the Court’s judgment but wrote a separate
opinion to comment that he remained troubled by the evidentiary basis for
failure-to-warn claims.97 Plaintiff’s counsel did not clearly articulate how a
warning could have changed the outcome here or what message that warning should have contained.98 Justice Rice believes the jury was asked to
make a stretch in assuming that a warning would have prevented Brandon
from pitching to the CB 13 bat.99 But in the end, Justice Rice concluded
that the issues were correctly submitted to the jury, and he deferred to the
jury’s verdict.100
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 389.
Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 198–199 (Mont. 1993).
Patch, 257 P.3d at 389.
Id. at 389–390.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 389–390.
Id.
Patch, 257 P.3d at 390.
Id. at 391 (Rice, J., concurring).
Id. at 391–392.
Id. at 392.
Id.
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Patch offers valuable and innovative precedent to plaintiffs hoping to
take advantage of expansive definitions of the “user” or “consumer” of a
product. Manufacturers should pay close attention to the Court’s indication
that warnings placed directly on a product may be inadequate to warn everyone at risk. Finally, parties should be aware of the flexible standard of
proof for causation in failure-to-warn cases to avoid making the same mistake H & B made by assuming Riley always requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a warning would have altered their conduct.
Patch received much attention in the legal community, perhaps because of the seeming absurdity of requiring a pitcher to be warned that a
ball might fly in his direction at a dangerous speed. Yet, after a closer look,
Patch’s real importance lies in its potential to significantly change Montana
products liability law by expanding the definition of “user” and “consumer”
to include virtually anyone placed at risk by a product.
—Paul Burdett
III.

STATE V. UPDEGRAFF101

In State v. Updegraff, the Montana Supreme Court clarified Montana’s
common-law approach to analyzing the authority of out-of-jurisdiction
peace officers to conduct warrantless arrests.102 The Court affirmed the
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, or alternatively,
to suppress the evidence against him on the grounds that it was unlawful for
law enforcement officers to arrest him outside their territorial jurisdiction.103 Reconciling the purposes of Montana’s private person arrest statute
with a peace officer’s jurisdictionally limited authority, the Court held that
“an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer must meet the standard [for arrest] that
would apply to a private person in the same circumstances.”104 Specifically, an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer must have “probable cause to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense and the
existing circumstances require the person’s immediate arrest.”105 If met,
the officer may proceed to arrest the individual in accordance with the procedures applicable to peace officers.106
Around 1:00 a.m. on July 12, 2009, Jefferson County Reserve Deputy
Francine Janik observed a car parked in a “day use only” fishing access site
in neighboring Madison County while returning to Jefferson County after
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

State v. Updegraff, 267 P.3d 28 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 32, 36.
Id. at 32, 35.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 44 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46–6–502(1) (2011)).
Id.
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an encounter that led her across county lines.107 Deputy Janik decided to
initiate a welfare check on the vehicle to “make sure there was nothing
going on that might need some attention.”108 She did not contact Madison
County law enforcement because she did not believe there were any officers
in the area at the time.109 Upon making contact with the vehicle, Deputy
Janik observed that the driver, Floyd Thomas Updegraff (“Updegraff”), had
his head back against the seat, his eyes closed, and was not moving.110
After several failed attempts to wake Updegraff, Deputy Janik finally
caught his attention; however, he seemed “disoriented and confused” and
had slurred speech.111
Deputy Janik’s welfare check under the community caretaker doctrine
ripened into an investigation for driving under the influence (“DUI”).112
She made several observations of Updegraff’s person and vehicle which
gave her probable cause to determine Updegraff was, or had been, driving
while under the influence of alcohol.113 Deputy Michael Wharton, also
from Jefferson County, responded to the scene to assist Deputy Janik in
Updegraff’s arrest.114 Deputy Janik attempted to perform field sobriety
tests to further the DUI investigation, but Updegraff refused.115 The deputies placed Updegraff under arrest on suspicion of DUI and transferred him
to jail.116
Updegraff was charged with three criminal offenses, including felony
DUI (sixth offense).117 Updegraff moved to dismiss or, in the alternative,
suppress evidence from the stop, challenging the legality of Deputy Janik’s
out-of-jurisdiction arrest.118 The district court denied Updegraff’s motion,
presuming Deputy Janik and Deputy Wharton “were ‘merely private citizens’ while they were in Madison County,” and found the arrest lawful
under the private person arrest statute.119 A jury convicted Updegraff on all
charges.120 Updegraff appealed to the Montana Supreme Court to review
the district court’s denial of his motions to dismiss and suppress.121
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 32.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31, 36.
Id. at 31, 35.
Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 31.
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The Montana Supreme Court found the district court’s treatment of onduty Deputies Janik and Wharton as private persons “difficult to square
with reality.”122 The Court determined the deputies conducted themselves
as peace officers, not private persons, when they investigated Updegraff for
DUI.123 The Court reasoned that a sworn peace officer is not a private
person, and the private person arrest statute applies only to actual private
persons.124 Therefore, an arrest made by a peace officer cannot be analyzed
under the private person arrest statute.125
Before outlining the proper analysis for arrests made by out-of-jurisdiction peace officers, the Court began with a brief overview of the private
person arrest statute.126 Noting that it was developed in the interest of public safety, the Court explained that the purposes of the private person arrest
statute127 are:
(1) to provide a mechanism whereby a person, who is not a peace officer, may
lawfully arrest another under the limited circumstances described in the statute and (2) to require that the nearest available law enforcement agency or
peace officer immediately be given notice and custody of the arrestee.128

Given these purposes, the Court found that the statute applies only to arrests
by non-peace officers “whose arrest authority is, by statute, limited to that
of a ‘private person.’”129
The Court then turned its analysis to precedent governing the authority
of an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer to make an arrest. The Court found
its holding in State v. McDole130 and the cases following it controlling.131
McDole and its progeny defined the scope of a peace officer’s jurisdictional
limits and recognized exceptions.132 The Court extracted and reaffirmed
the following key principles:
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 39.
126. Id. at 36.
127. Arrest by private person. “(1) A private person may arrest another when there is probable cause
to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense and the existing circumstances
require the person’s immediate arrest. The private person may use reasonable force to detain the arrested
person. (2) A private person making an arrest shall immediately notify the nearest available law enforcement agency or peace officer and give custody of the person arrested to the officer or agency.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–6–502 (2011).
128. Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 38.
129. Id. at 39.
130. State v. McDole, 734 P.2d 683 (Mont. 1987).
131. Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 39–41. The Court relied on the following caselaw in its analysis of
McDole’s progeny: State v. Sunford, 796 P.2d 1084 (Mont. 1990), Maney v. State, 842 P.2d 704 (Mont.
1992), State v. Hendrickson, 939 P.2d 985 (Mont. 1997), and State v. Williamson, 965 P.2d 231 (Mont.
1998).
132. Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 42.
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First, the scope of a peace officer’s authority is limited by the territorial jurisdictional limits of the law enforcement entity for which the officer works,
which means an officer outside his or her territorial jurisdiction may not make
arrests as a peace officer and may not use criminal procedure statutes expressly limited in application to “peace officers.” Second, Montana recognizes two exceptions to this general rule: (a) an out-of-jurisdiction officer may
use his or her authority as a peace officer if authorized to do so by statute and
(b) an out-of-jurisdiction officer may make an arrest under circumstances
which would authorize a private citizen to do so.133

The second exception concerning the authority of out-of-jurisdiction
officers to make arrests is not covered specifically by any statutory provision, but has been carved out by caselaw.134 The Court stated this authority
has been inaccurately characterized to lead state courts to assume “that an
out-of-jurisdiction officer’s actions must comply with the private person arrest statute in toto.”135 Because peace officers “are ‘always’ peace officers”
and do not suddenly forget all of their training and experience by crossing
“an imaginary jurisdictional line in the sand,” an out-of-jurisdiction peace
officer does not morph into a private person to fall within the grasp of
statutory law.136 Instead, the Court applied the principle that “a peace officer acting outside the territorial limits of his [or her] authority does not
have less authority to arrest than a person who is a private citizen.”137
Finally, the Court harmonized the purposes of the private person arrest
statute with a peace officer’s jurisdictionally limited authority. The Court
concluded that an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer may not make an arrest
in the same capacity as a peace officer within his respective jurisdiction, but
must meet the same necessary standard to make an arrest as a private person
in the same circumstance.138 The standard requires “probable cause to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense and the
existing circumstances require the person’s immediate arrest.”139 An outof-jurisdiction peace officer who meets this burden may then conduct criminal investigation functions including investigating the scene, “gathering evidence, and transporting the arrestee to the nearest detention facility,” within
the confines of the constitutional and statutory mandates governing warrantless arrests.140
Under the revised approach, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Updegraff’s motion to dismiss or suppress, and found Updegraff’s
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 44 (quoting People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 216 (Colo. 1981) (emphasis added)).
Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 44.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–6–502(1) (2011).
Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 44.
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arrest lawful.141 Deputies Janik and Wharton acted as out-of-jurisdiction
peace officers who initiated an arrest under circumstances that would have
justified an arrest by a private person: they had probable cause that Updegraff committed an offense and the situation required his immediate arrest.142 The Court also found Deputy Janik’s initial contact with Updegraff
justified under the community caretaker doctrine, analogizing the unrestricted right of a private person to simply approach a vehicle to conduct a
welfare check to an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer in the same circumstance.143 Therefore, the Court found proof Deputy Janik met the criteria of
the community caretaker doctrine when she initiated a welfare check on
Updegraff, and that her subsequent observations ripened into a lawful DUI
investigation giving rise to “probable cause of a criminal offense involving
an immediate, real danger to Updegraff and other motorists.”144
The Montana practitioner should take note of the clarified approach to
analyzing the lawfulness of warrantless arrests made by out-of-jurisdiction
peace officers. Out-of-jurisdiction peace officers are still sworn officers
even beyond their jurisdictional lines and should not be treated as “private
persons” under the private person arrest statute.145 An out-of-jurisdiction
officer may make an arrest if the circumstances presented allow for a private person to make an arrest under the private person arrest statute—the
officer has “probable cause to believe that a person is committing or has
committed an offense and the existing circumstances require the person’s
immediate arrest.”146 If the burden is met, the officer “may follow the procedures applicable to peace officers in processing the arrest.”147 This ruling
is significant since Montana statutory law is silent on this specific issue.
—Jessica Finley
IV. WEBER V. BNSF RAILWAY CORPORATION148
In Weber v. BNSF Railway Corporation, the Montana Supreme Court
rejected a railroad company’s application of a Ninth Circuit decision regarding the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”). In so doing, the Court
plainly affirmed that the standard for causation in Montana LIA cases is
whether an injury was, in any way, caused by a safety violation. This stan141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 44.
Updegraff, 267 P.3d at 45.
Id. at 45.
Weber v. BNSF Railway Co., 261 P.3d 984 (Mont. 2011).
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dard specifically rejected the proximate cause standard proposed by the defendant railway company.
BNSF employed Heather Weber as a locomotive engineer.149 On February 4, 2007, Weber and Chad Ferguson, a conductor, drove a coal train
from Gillette, Wyoming to Guernsey, Wyoming.150 The train was powered
by two locomotives in the front and two in the rear; this arrangement is
referred to as “distributed power” (“DP”). The DP is controlled by the engineer in the front of the train, and the engineer is able to disable, or “isolate,” the DP.151 Isolation became necessary during the trip at issue as the
train approached a tunnel known as “Tunnel 3.”152 As Weber’s train neared
Tunnel 3, she realized that she had not isolated the DP. She stopped the
train to isolate the DP, but the quick stop caused “bunching and stretching
between the railcars,” which, in turn, caused a knuckle (a railcar coupling
mechanism) to break. The broken knuckle caused the train to stop and go
into “emergency” mode, and a default code flashed on a screen.153 A
mechanical assistance team replaced the knuckle, but the default code
proved more obstinate. Even with the help of BNSF operators, Weber and
Ferguson could not determine the source of the code and were unable to
restart the train.154
Trainmaster and supervisor Houston Cullison was called to the site and
was told that the code read “BLD.”155 The code refers to the application of
brakes to the DP, but no one on site at the time knew its meaning.156 Cullison instructed Weber to connect with DP to move the train toward the tunnel. She did so, but the train stopped again when Weber isolated the DP
inside the tunnel. Cullison directed Weber to stay in the cab while he and
Ferguson prepared the train to reverse out of the tunnel; the two front locomotives continued to run while she waited. Varying witness estimates suggest that Weber spent from ten to forty minutes in the tunnel.157
The next day, Weber and Ferguson drove another train back toward
Gillette. Before the train left Guernsey, Weber began to complain of nausea.158 Over the next several months, she experienced more nausea, along
with “headaches, fatigue, disorientation, tremors, forgetfulness and diffi149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 988.
Id.
Weber, 261 P.3d at 988.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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culty focusing her eyes.”159 On July 31, 2007, she filed suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) to recover for injuries she allegedly suffered during the time she spent in the tunnel.160 Weber’s four-part
complaint alleged that BNSF breached its duty under FELA, and violated
the LIA, the Safety Appliance Act (“SAA”) and other federal regulations
and standards.161
After examining Weber in March 2008, Dr. Hugh Batty formed a
working diagnosis that Weber had suffered carbon monoxide poisoning
from her time in the tunnel.162 Batty referred Weber to Dr. Daniel
Alzheimer who, at Batty’s request, performed a PET scan of Weber on
August 14, 2008. Alzheimer found the scan “consistent with [carbon monoxide] exposure with no corroborative findings on the CT scan as discussed.”163 Batty then formally diagnosed Weber as having permanent
brain damage secondary to carbon monoxide exposure.164
Before trial, the district court granted BNSF’s motion to exclude the
PET scan evidence.165 BNSF later moved to dismiss Weber’s LIA and
SAA claims. The court denied the motion but also refused to include both
Weber’s special verdict form and jury instructions regarding LIA and SAA.
As the Supreme Court noted, “[the] jury was thus not presented with
Weber’s claim that BNSF violated the LIA or SAA.”166 On May 7, 2010,
the jury found BNSF not negligent, and Weber subsequently appealed.167
The first issue the Supreme Court considered was whether the district
court erred when it granted BNSF’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
on Weber’s LIA claim.168 The LIA imposes an absolute duty on railroads
to provide their employees with properly working equipment.169 The LIA
itself does not contain a cause of action, but an employee may sue under
FELA citing a statutory violation of the LIA.170 The LIA provides, in pertinent part:
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its
railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances—
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Weber, 261 P.3d at 988–989.
Id.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Weber, 261 P.3d at 989.
Id.
Id. at 990.
Id. (citing Plouffe v. Burlington N., 730 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Mont. 1987)).
Id. (citing Dallas v. Burlington N., 689 P.2d 273, 276 (Mont. 1984)).
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(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of
personal injury.171

To establish a violation of the LIA, the plaintiff must show that those parts
or appurtenances did not “perform properly in an intended service for which
[they were] being used.”172
Given those standards, the Court determined that the district court
erred when it refused to present Weber’s LIA claim to the jury.173 Because
witness testimony indicated that the two front locomotives had sufficient
power to move the train under normal circumstances, the Court concluded
that the locomotives could not have been properly performing their intended services if they could not move the train during the trip at issue.174
That testimony, according to the Court, should have been sufficient to send
the alleged LIA violation to the jury.175
The Court next addressed BNSF’s claim that Weber could not recover
under the LIA because her injuries were caused by incidental circumstances—specifically, Cullison ordering her to stay in the running locomotive while it sat in the tunnel—and not by any deficiency in the equipment.176 BNSF relied on Oglesby v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company,177 which held that the alleged defects first must be deemed unsafe to
constitute an LIA violation.178 In Oglesby, an engineer injured his back
when he tried to lift a seat in his locomotive. The seat was secured by
different sort of mechanism than Oglesby had expected, and he injured himself attempting to remove it.179 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
Oglesby’s claim that a violation could be proven by simply showing that
the seat was not working efficiently; rather, a violation only occurs under
the statute when a part is deemed “unsafe.”180
Rejecting BNSF’s application of Oglesby to the instant case, the Court
noted that the seat on Oglesby’s train was not functioning improperly—it
was simply functioning in a way different from what Oglesby expected.181
Evidence suggested that Weber’s locomotive, on the other hand, was functioning improperly when it failed to propel the train forward.182 Additionally, even if Cullison’s order that Weber remain in the train contributed to
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006).
Weber, 261 P.3d at 990–991 (citing S. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 375 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1967)).
Id.at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oglesby v. S.P. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
Weber, 261 P.3d at 991–992.
Id. at 992 (citing Oglesby, 6 F.3d at 604).
Id. (citing Oglesby, 6 F.3d at 610).
Id.
Id.
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her eventual injuries, Weber could still prevail under a FELA claim because
a defendant can be held liable if its negligence “played a part—no matter
how small—in bringing about the injury.”183 Therefore, the standard of
proof in FELA cases is not the proximate cause standard argued by BNSF,
but rather whether the defendant’s negligence played any part whatsoever in
the injury.
The Montana practitioner should note that the standard the Court will
follow in FELA (and, by extension, LIA and SAA) cases is not the proximate cause standard found in most negligence cases but whether the defendant’s negligence played any role, no matter how small, in the plaintiff’s
injuries. The Montana Supreme Court appears to be following the advice of
the United States Supreme Court that the LIA’s purpose as a safety statute
requires it to be “liberally construed” in favor of an injured worker.184
Though the Ninth Circuit denied application of the LIA protection in
Oglesby, it would be hasty to characterize that court as hostile toward the
United States Supreme Court’s “liberally construed” standard. Rather, the
Oglesby decision more likely reflects the Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to grant
relief based on nothing more than an individual employee’s inability to use
perfectly sound equipment. Thus, the Montana Court’s holding in Weber
should not be viewed as an outright rejection of the Ninth Circuit but
merely, as the Court wrote, a refusal to “expand the application of Oglesby
beyond its particular facts.”185
—Justin Harkins
V.

MONTANA TROUT UNLIMITED V. BEAVERHEAD WATER COMPANY186

In Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Company, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana Trout Unlimited (“Trout Unlimited”) had both standing and a sufficient “ownership interest” in the Big
Hole River Basin waters to require the Water Court to hold a hearing on
Trout Unlimited’s objections to certain claims in the preliminary decree of
water rights in that basin.187 The Court concluded that there is no statutory
or regulatory restriction regarding who is allowed to file an objection to a
water right claim contained in a temporary preliminary decree.188
In April 2007, the Water Court issued a temporary preliminary decree
for the Big Hole River Basin containing all water right claims that existed
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 991 (citing CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630 (2011)).
Weber, 261 P.3d at 990 (citing Lilly v. Grant Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943)).
Id. at 992.
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 184.
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prior to July 1, 1973.189 Trout Unlimited filed timely objections to certain
claims contained therein.190 The claimants moved to dismiss Trout Unlimited’s objections, asserting that Trout Unlimited did not actually possess
any water rights in the Basin, and therefore, did not have standing to object.191 After converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary
judgment, the Water Court granted summary judgment to the claimants,
agreeing that Trout Unlimited did not have standing to file objections to the
water rights claims.192
Trout Unlimited is a statewide organization dedicated to preserving
and restoring Montana’s coldwater fisheries.193 It has actively participated
in restoration efforts for wild fish in the Big Hole River Basin and is a
participant in the Big Hole Watershed Committee.194 Trout Unlimited has
also made monetary contributions to support a voluntary drought plan on
the Big Hole River in an effort to maintain minimum instream flows.195
According to Trout Unlimited, unsupported large water rights claims could
undermine its significant efforts at river and fish protection and restoration.196
Despite acknowledging Trout Unlimited’s “historical contributions”
and noting it had “contributed much to the outcomes” in the Basin, the
Water Court nevertheless found that the provisions of Montana Code Annotated § 85–2–233 required objectors to demonstrate “good cause” by showing “an ownership interest in water or its use.”197 The Water Court found
no evidence that Trout Unlimited or any of its members possessed any pre1973 water rights claims, nor that the organization subsequently applied for
any new use certificates or permits.198 It went on to hold that in the absence
of an “ownership interest in water or its use,” “personal environmental and
recreational interests” cannot establish the “personal stake” required for
standing on objections to claims contained in a preliminary decree.199 The
Water Court also rejected Trout Unlimited’s argument that it had a “legitimate role to play” in assessing statements the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation added to water rights abstracts which identify legal or factual issues associated with those claims.200
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 182.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Trout Unlimited raised two issues on appeal. First, it asserted the
Water Court wrongly held that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks (“DFWP”) “may represent public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings.” Second, it argued that parties who
do not hold water rights must still be allowed to request hearings on any of
their objections in adjudication proceedings.201
Beginning with the first issue, the Montana Supreme Court found the
Water Court’s application of § 85–2–223 overbroad, and held that while the
statute did limit DFWP as the sole party that could establish those uses,
Trout Unlimited’s goal was only to enhance the amount of instream flows
available for recreation and fish habitat.202 The Court then addressed the
Water Court’s holding that the same statute precluded an organization such
as Trout Unlimited from filing objections in the water rights adjudication
process. The Court traced the statutory process for the filing of objections
and noted that the process required broad public notice, allowed objections
for at least 180 days without limiting who could file those objections, required notice to those claimants whose rights had been objected to, and then
required the Water Court to hold a hearing on the objections.203 In conclusion, the Court held that “there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on
who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a
temporary preliminary decree . . . .”204
Next, the Court addressed the issue of who may request a hearing on
objections in adjudication proceedings. Section 85–2–233 provides that the
Water Court must hold a hearing “for good cause shown” on the objection
to water rights claims.205 “Good cause” is defined as “a written statement
[showing] that a person has an ownership interest in water or its use that has
been affected by the decree.”206 The Water Court interpreted Trout Unlimited’s lack of explicit water rights as insufficient ownership interest which
did not entitle Trout Unlimited to a hearing.207
The Court disagreed with this interpretation.208 It first addressed the
established rules of standing, and cited the general test that a “complaining
party must clearly allege past, present or threatened injury to a property or
civil right, and the alleged injury must be distinguishable from the injury to
the public generally, but it need not be exclusive to the complaining
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 184.
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–233(1)(a)).
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–233(1)(b)).
Id.
Id.
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party.”209 The Court also relied on the fact that it has allowed citizen organizations to challenge governmental actions.210 It also disagreed with the
Water Court’s application of common law rules of standing and concluded
that Trout Unlimited had standing only to challenge the constitutionality of
agency decisions or governmental acts.211 The Court further disagreed with
the Water Court’s reasoning that due to lack of water right ownership, Trout
Unlimited had not demonstrated a “personal stake” in the adjudication process sufficient to challenge the claims of other water rights holders.212
Beginning its analysis with the Montana Constitution, the Court stated
that all waters in Montana are the property of the State for the use of its
people.213 Further, the public owns instream rights to the recreational use
of all navigable waters of the State, and both the Montana Constitution and
the public trust doctrine “do not permit a private party to interfere with the
public’s right to recreational use of the surface of the State’s waters.”214
The Court then quoted from a litany of statutes recognizing that the State
holds Montana’s waters for the benefit of the people and the State’s responsibilities under the public trust doctrine.215 It noted that “water is a public
resource that cannot be owned by the individual users” and that water rights
are usufructory—that is, they confer a right only to use water—not to own
it.216 Relying on these sources, the Court concluded that the claimants’
assertion that a water right is the only method of establishing an “ownership
interest” in the use of water was in error.217
Because Trout Unlimited demonstrated “personal environmental and
recreational interests in the Big Hole River Basin” and because those interests were distinct from the public at large and could be adversely affected
by the preliminary decree, the Court held Trout Unlimited had standing.218
The Court also found that Trout Unlimited complied with all statutory requirements of requesting notice and properly objected to specific claims in
the preliminary decree.219 Therefore, because the State owns the waters of
Montana and holds them in public trust for its citizens, and Trout Unlimited
had demonstrated “undisputed specific interests” in the Big Hole Basin,
209. Id.
210. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 184.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3).
214. Id. at 184–185.
215. Id. at 185.
216. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 185 (quoting Albert W. Stone, Montana Water Law 70
(State Bar of Montana 1994)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 185–186.
219. Id. at 186.
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Trout Unlimited had an ownership or use interest sufficient to trigger a
hearing on its objections.220
After addressing the specific issues of the case, the Court went on to
clarify the scope of the Water Right Adjudication Rules. It noted that policy, statutory language, and caselaw supported a broad reach of the statutes
as a whole.221 It also found the Water Court had previously held that the
process was designed “in the interest of resolving all potential disputes that
could arise” in the process, and had specifically adopted a “broad tent” policy when considering objections to water compacts.222 In other cases, the
Water Court had actually invited widespread participation, notably in the
Bean Lake223 series of cases, and had even required DFWP to bear the costs
of other parties with the goal of ensuring “full presentation of all public
interests.”224
Finally, the Court addressed the Water Court’s concerns that the consequences of allowing Trout Unlimited to object would “open the process”
such that it would “overwhelm the process” of adjudicating water rights.225
Again, the Court disagreed with the Water Court, and found that the Water
Court had previously invited widespread participation.226 It also noted the
Water Court had “sufficient procedural tools and powers” to streamline the
process, including the power to order settlement conferences and appoint
special masters.227
There were two dissents. Justice Rice dissented to the overall holding,
and agreed with the Water Court that Trout Unlimited’s lack of water rights
should deny them the “ownership interest” requirement necessary to file
objections in the adjudication process.228 Justice Nelson also dissented in
part, citing the broad scope of the decision.229 While he agreed with the
overall holding because Trout Unlimited had satisfied “constitutional, prudential, and statutory standing requirements,” he noted that the broader
ramifications of the decision will “expand the recognized parameters of
standing beyond sustainable limits.”230
Whether or not these concerns come to pass remains to be seen, but it
is clear that the Court has definitively opened the water rights adjudication
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 186–187.
Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 187.
In the Matter of the Dearborn Drainage, 766 P.2d 228 (Mont. 1988).
Mont. Trout Unlimited, 255 P.3d at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193–194 (Rice, J., dissenting).
Id. at 188 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 193.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013

21

Montana Law Review, Vol. 73 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-2\MON203.txt

466

unknown

Seq: 22

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

2-NOV-12

15:55

Vol. 73

process to a wider spectrum of interested parties. At a minimum, environmental groups or individuals who have participated in any water issues in a
specific basin may now challenge preliminary adjudication decrees.
—Jesse Kodadek
VI.

WRIGG V. JUNKERMIER, CLARK, CAMPANELLA, STEVENS, P.C.231

In Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., the Montana Supreme Court addressed, as an issue of first impression, whether an
employer can enforce a covenant not to compete after the employer ends the
employment relationship.232 The Court answered that question in the negative and added a threshold requirement that an employer establish a legitimate business interest in order to enforce a covenant not to compete.233
This holding demonstrates the Court’s general disfavor for covenants not to
compete, particularly when the employer ends the employment relationship.234
In 1987, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. (“JCCS”), an
accounting firm, hired Dawn Wrigg (“Wrigg”), a certified public accountant, to work as a staff accountant in its Helena office. Wrigg was promoted
to shareholder status in 2003.235 Prior to 2009, Wrigg signed three Shareholder Agreements, all featuring the same covenant not to compete.236 The
covenant provided that if the Agreement is “terminated for any reason” and
the shareholder “provides professional services in a business . . . in competition with JCCS”, the shareholder must compensate JCCS if she serves one
of JCCS’s clients within one year of the termination.237
In May 2009, Wrigg received a letter from JCCS’s CEO stating that
JCCS would not renew her most recent Agreement, due to expire June 30,
2009.238 The letter stated the decision was best for all parties, “[g]iven the
culture in the Helena office . . . ” and concluded with a reminder of the
JCCS covenant.239 When Wrigg began searching for employment elsewhere, other accounting firms expressed concerns about the JCCS covenant.240 Eventually, Wrigg accepted employment with Rudd and Company
(“Rudd”) at a significant pay cut ($87,000 at Rudd compared to $154,000 at
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 648, 650.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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JCCS); the pay cut was directly related to concerns Rudd had with the
JCCS covenant.241
Wrigg conceded that she solicited business from, and worked for,
JCCS’s clients within a year of her termination, and JCCS subsequently
sent her a demand letter seeking compensation pursuant to the JCCS covenant.242 Wrigg sought judicial determination of the enforceability of the
covenant.243 The district court found the covenant reasonable and enforceable, and Wrigg appealed.244
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Morris, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Wrigg.245 The Court addressed the
issue of whether an employer can enforce a covenant not to compete when
the employer ends the employment relationship.246 The Court began its
analysis by stating the well-established principle that “Montana law
strongly disfavors [and strictly construes] covenants not to compete.”247
The Court also reads covenants in a light most favorable to the employee248
and voids covenants that act as a full restraint on trade.249 The Court reviews covenants that impose a partial restraint on trade, like the JCCS covenant, for reasonableness.250 Under the Court’s decision in Dobbins, De
Guire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson,251 a covenant is
considered reasonable if it meets the following three elements:
(1) The covenant should be limited in operation either as to time or place;
(2) the covenant should be based on some good consideration; and
(3) the covenant should afford reasonable protection for and not impose an
unreasonable burden upon the employer, the employee, or the public.252
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 654.
246. Id. at 648.
247. Id. (citing Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899, 902 (Mont. 2008) (stating that
“[s]ince Montana’s public policy strongly disfavors agreements in restraint of trade . . . we construe noncompete agreements strictly”)).
248. Id. at 649 (citing Dumont v. Tucker, 822 P.2d 96, 98 (Mont. 1991) (quoting 54 Am. Jur. 2d
Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 521, which reads: “Contracts not to compete are by their nature in
restraint of trade and are not favorably regarded by the courts. In interpreting or construing contracts
which impose restrictions on the right of a party to engage in a business or occupation, the court is
governed by a strict rule of construction. The agreement will not be extended by implication, and it will
be construed in favor of rather than against the interest of the covenantor.”)).
249. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 649 (citing Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 221 P.3d 1230, 1237–1238
(Mont. 2009).
250. Id. (citing Mont. Mt. Prods. v. Curl, 112 P.3d 979, 980–982 (Mont. 2005).
251. Dobbins, De Guire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 708 P.2d 577 (Mont.
1985).
252. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 649 (citing Mungas, 221 P.3d at 1237 (citing Dobbins, De Guire & Tucker,
P.C., 708 P.2d at 580)).
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Although the district court found the JCCS covenant reasonable under
this standard, Wrigg argued on appeal that JCCS should have to assert a
legitimate business interest in order to enforce the covenant.253 Wrigg further argued that an employer lacks such an interest when it ends the employment relationship.254 JCCS argued only that Montana caselaw bound
the Court to rule in its favor, without citing any caselaw finding a covenant
enforceable when the employer ended the employment relationship or providing a “policy argument to offset Montana’s public policy against restrictive covenants.”255 JCCS argued that the covenant was reasonable per se
because it mirrored the language in Dobbins, but the Court determined that
JCCS misinterpreted Dobbins.256 Dobbins did not declare covenants with
particular language enforceable as a matter of law.257 “Dobbins simply
held that covenants . . . should be subject to a reasonableness analysis under
appropriate circumstances. . . . [which] require that legitimate business reasons exist to justify the covenant.”258
The Court acknowledged that whether an employer must establish a
legitimate business interest in order to enforce a covenant was an issue of
first impression.259 Such a requirement “acknowledges the long standing
principle that a covenant that serves no legitimate business interest necessarily is oppressive and invalid.”260 The Court recognized the “deep, historical roots”261 of the requirement and that a lack of legitimate business interest necessarily equates to a “greater restraint than is needed.”262 It noted
that in other jurisdictions a legitimate business interest is a threshold inquiry
in reviewing a covenant,263 and other “[c]ourts will not enforce covenants if
an employer lacks a legitimate business interest.”264 Finally, the Court clarified that while the Dobbins test does not explicitly require a legitimate
business interest, the Court in Dobbins did cite the American Law Reports,
which requires such an interest.265 Given these conclusions, the Court
“adopt[ed] expressly the requirement that an employer must establish a le253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 649–650.
258. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 650.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts vol. 6, § 30:4, 164–175 (4th ed., West
2009)).
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contract § 188(1)(a) (1981)).
263. Id. (noting Syncom Indus., Inc. v. Wood, 920 A.2d 1178, 1185 (N.H. 2007); Freiburger v. J-UB Engrs., Inc., 111 P.3d 100, 105 (Idaho 2005)).
264. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 650 (noting Am. Inst. of Chem. Engrs. v. Reber-Friel Co., 682 F.2d 382, 387
(2d Cir. 1982); Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 922 (Pa. 2002)).
265. Id. (citing Dobbins, De Guire & Tucker, P.C., 708 P.2d at 580).
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gitimate business interest as a threshold step to [the] analysis of the reasonableness of a covenant.”266
To determine whether the JCCS covenant served a legitimate business
interest, the Court looked to other jurisdictions to define the nature of the
business interest that a covenant serves.267 First, the Court concluded that
in order to have a legitimate business interest in a covenant, it must serve to
“protect an employer’s good will, customer relationships, or trade information.”268 Second, the Court recognized that the disfavor for covenants not
to compete is heightened when an employer chooses to end the employment
relationship because “termination creates inequitable circumstances for an
employee” and enforcement of a covenant “could impoverish an employee
who has done nothing to warrant his termination.”269 Accordingly, the
Court confirmed that a stricter standard for enforcement applies when an
employee is terminated without cause.270 Third, the Court established that
“an employer assumes the risk of competition from a former employer
when it chooses to end the employment relationship” and therefore lacks a
legitimate business interest in enforcing a covenant.271
The Court clarified its holding in two ways. First, it did not preclude
all employers that end an employment relationship from seeking to enforce
a covenant not to compete.272 Some employee conduct or misconduct that
is detrimental to the employer or its clients—such as the employee using
trade secrets, customer relationships, or proprietary information to compete
with the employer—could give an employer a legitimate reason to enforce a
covenant; although the employer bears the burden of establishing such a
reason.273 Second, in response to JCCS’s argument that it did not terminate
Wrigg, but that her contract expired, the Court declared that its “analysis
266. Id. The Court went on to say: “This approach comports with the disfavor of covenants not to
compete expressed in Montana law.” Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 651 (noting Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 188, cmt. b; Guardian Fiberglass,
Inc. v. Whit Davis Lumber Co., 509 F.3d 512, 516 (8th Cir. 2007); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 224 (7th
Cir. 1983); United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 381–382 (N.C. 1988); Boisen v. Petersen
Flying Serv., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 29, 34–35 (Neb. 1986)). The Court went on to explain: “This limitation
ensures that businesses will use a covenant only when less restrictive measures will not suffice.” Id.
269. Id. at 652 (noting Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgt. Intl., 859 N.E.2d 503, 506–507 (N.Y. 2006);
Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 1984); Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith, 397 N.E.2d 358, 360–361 (N.Y. 1979)).
270. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 652 (noting C. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 520
(S.D. 1996); C. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984)).
271. Id. at 653 (noting Rao, 718 F.2d at 224; Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 736
(Pa. 1995)).
272. Id.
273. Id. (noting Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 583 (N.J. 1971) (“refusing to enforce a
covenant where the employer had failed to make an adequate evidentiary showing that it needed to
enforce the covenant to protect against the employee using trade secrets to compete with the company”)).
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concerning an employer’s legitimate interest in the enforceability of covenants applies to both a terminated contract and an expired contract.”274 Accordingly, the Court held that JCCS could not enforce its covenant against
Wrigg because it ended the employment relationship and failed to provide
any evidence giving rise to a legitimate business interest for enforcement.275
Wrigg establishes that, as a threshold matter, an employer must have a
legitimate business interest in a covenant not to compete for it to be reasonable under the Dobbins test. Wrigg also establishes there is generally no
legitimate business interest in a covenant not to compete when the employer
ends the employment relationship. Consistent with its precedential disfavor
for covenants not to compete, the Court in Wrigg made it much more difficult for employers to enforce those covenants.
—Stephanie Holstein
VII.

STOKES V. MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT276

In Stokes v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, the Montana
Supreme Court held that Montana’s statute prohibiting evidence of seatbelt
use in civil cases does not apply to negligence or products liability claims
based on the design or conditions of seatbelt restraint systems.277 After
determining that supervisory control was appropriate, the Court concluded
that Montana Code Annotated § 61–13–106 did not preclude Dennis Stokes
(“Stokes”) from presenting evidence of seatbelt use in his negligence and
products liability claims, which were both based on allegations of a defective seatbelt.278
The underlying case arose out of a motor vehicle accident that killed
Peter Carter (“Carter”).279 Stokes, the Personal Representative of Carter’s
Estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action against the other driver,
Todd Durham (“Durham”); the manufacturer, Ford; and the rental car company, Overland West, Inc. (“Overland”).280 Though Durham admitted to
negligently causing the crash, Stokes maintained that Carter would have
only sustained minor injuries but for the malfunctioning of his seatbelt.281
Stokes claimed Ford negligently designed, developed, and tested the
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 654.
Id.
Stokes v. Mont. Thirteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 259 P.3d 754 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 757, 759.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 756.
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seatbelt and alleged strict products liability for Ford’s defective design.282
He also asserted Overland negligently maintained the vehicle and was
strictly liable for inserting the vehicle in the stream of commerce.283
Following the language of § 61–13–106,284 which prohibits evidence
of seatbelt use in civil claims, and the reasoning in Chapman v. Mazda
Motor of America, Inc.,285 the district court ruled the seatbelt use evidence
was admissible in Stokes’s products liability claims, but inadmissible in the
negligence claims.286 The court reasoned that admitting the seatbelt use
evidence solely for the products liability claims would confuse the jury too
much, even with a limiting instruction.287 Accordingly, it instructed Stokes
that he would have to drop his negligence claims against all three defendants if he planned on using the evidence in his products liability claims.288
The Montana Supreme Court granted Stokes’s petition for supervisory
control after emphasizing that such control is only exercised in “extraordinary circumstances.”289 The Court determined: preparation and presentation would be significantly affected if both legal theories were allowed; the
ruling could determine if Stokes’s claims would be tried alone, together, or
at all; the course of litigation would be altered dramatically depending on
resolution of the question; the district court’s conclusions, if incorrect,
would impact the entire proceedings including settlement negotiations and
trial; appeal would be an insufficient remedy because of the costs and delay
of a retrial; and, denial of a speedy remedy through supervisory control on
such clear-cut legal issues would cause a substantial injustice.290
The Court analyzed Chapman’s application of § 61–13–106 and subsequently discussed the purpose of the statute.291 The Chapman Court held
that § 61–13–106 did not apply to product liability claims after it determined that the statute focused on conduct, which relates to negligence, and
not on the condition of the vehicle, which relates to strict liability.292 The
Court agreed with Chapman’s conclusion that § 61–13–106 does not apply
“when a defective or inoperable restraint system is at issue in a design
282. Stokes, 259 P.3d at 756.
283. Id.
284. Mont. Code Ann. § 61–13–106 (2011) reads: “Evidence of compliance or failure to comply
with 61–13–103 [the Seatbelt Use Required law] is not admissible in any civil action for personal injury
or property damage resulting from the use or operation of a motor vehicle, and failure to comply with
61–13–103 does not constitute negligence.”
285. Chapman v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Mont. 1998).
286. Stokes, 259 P.3d at 756.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 757 (citing Safeco v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2 P.3d 834, 837 (Mont. 2000)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 757–758.
292. Chapman, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1126–1127.
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case,” and it expounded that the statute is not limited to products liability
claims when the issue is the condition of the seatbelt.293 Since Stokes directly alleged that the seatbelt’s failure caused Carter’s injuries, the Court
held that evidence relating to seatbelt use must be allowed in Stokes’s
claims of negligent design and maintenance.294 The Court reasoned further
that the intention of the Seatbelt Use Act is to promote seatbelt use, not to
create civil liability arising from fault for not wearing a seatbelt.295
The Court discussed how most state courts have held that seatbelt use
evidence is admissible in defective design or seatbelt condition cases when
interpreting statutes similar to § 61–13–106.296 Disagreeing with Ford’s
contentions that it would suffer prejudice from the admission of seatbelt use
evidence, the Court predicted that the jury would unavoidably discover the
seatbelt use because of the nature of the claims.297 The Court also dismissed Ford’s parallel argument that the Court’s holding would create a
“one-way street” by always allowing evidence of use but never evidence of
nonuse.298 It approvingly cited similar cases from sister jurisdictions in
which the negligent designs of seat backs and restraint systems were at
issue.299 In these cases, the defendants successfully introduced evidence of
seatbelt nonuse, despite seatbelt use statutes similar to § 61–13–106.300
The Court concluded that § 61–13–106 does not prohibit evidence of
seatbelt use or nonuse in a claim sounding in negligence or strict liability
that is based on a defect in the occupant restraint system.301 Interestingly,
the Court did not specify how related the seatbelt nonuse must be to the
alleged crashworthiness defect, but the nonuse evidence apparently could be
admissible in claims alleging defective or negligently designed airbags or
seat backs.
Finally, the Court addressed the necessity of formulating a limiting
instruction to clarify for the jury the permissive purposes for which the
evidence may be used.302 The Court resolved that the district court could
293. Stokes, 259 P.3d at 758.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 758–759 (see Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn–Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1994);
Bishop v. Takata Corp., 12 P.3d 459 (Okla. 2000)).
297. Id. at 759.
298. Id.
299. Stokes, 259 P.3d at 759 (see e.g. Gen Motors Corp. v. Wolhar, 686 A.3d 170, 172–173 (Del.
1996) (affirmative defense that injuries caused by plaintiff’s failure to wear seatbelt allowed); Clark v.
Mazda Motor Corp., 68 P.3d 207, 209 (Okla. 2003) (seatbelt nonuse admissible where seat back and
seat design at issue); Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 732 (10th Cir. 1996) (seatbelt nonuse
admitted where plaintiff claimed defective restraint system).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 759–760.
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fashion a suitable limiting instruction without risking substantial jury confusion and provided examples of instructions used in similar cases from other
states.303
In sum, Stokes clarified that § 61–13–106 does not apply to claims
alleging negligent design or strict products liability based on conditions of
the restraint systems. The Montana practitioner should recognize that in
these types of claims, § 61–13–106 will not preclude plaintiffs from showing that people injured in vehicle accidents were wearing seatbelts. The
practitioner should also note that evidence of seatbelt nonuse will be admissible in claims arising out of the condition of vehicular restraint systems,
apparently including allegations of defective or negligently designed
airbags. Thus, in claims based on the condition of vehicular restraint systems, Stokes will likely operate to benefit both plaintiffs and defendants,
depending on whether the injured person was wearing his or her seatbelt.
—Peter Ivins
VIII.

CALDWELL V. MACO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST304

In Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Compensation Trust, the Montana Supreme Court declared a workers’ compensation statute unconstitutional for
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.305
Montana Code Annotated § 39–71–710 eliminated rehabilitation benefits to
claimants old enough to qualify for Social Security retirement benefits.306
The Court held that cost alone was insufficient to justify disparate treatment
of similar classes.307 Additionally, the Court determined that “eligibility for
Social Security benefits bears no rational relationship to a worker’s ability
or willingness to return to work.”308
On November 25, 2005, Harold Caldwell (“Caldwell”) slipped and fell
on an icy airport taxiway and suffered traumatic head injuries while working as the Ravalli County airport manager.309 At the time of the accident,
Caldwell was 77 years old.310 He worked 57 years of his life and only
stopped due to the injury.311
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 760.
Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Compen. Trust, 256 P.3d 923 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 931.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 924.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 924.
Id.
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MACo, the airport’s insurer, paid Caldwell’s claim of medical and
wage-loss benefits.312 On February 11, 2008, Caldwell reached medical
stability and asked MACo to initiate rehabilitation services pursuant to
Montana law, so that he could re-enter the workforce.313 MACo denied the
rehabilitation benefits to Caldwell based on § 39–71–710, which classifies
any disabled worker eligible for Social Security retirement benefits as retired.314 Under the statute, retired workers are precluded from receiving
permanent partial disability benefits (“PPD”), permanent total disability
benefits (“PTD”), and rehabilitation benefits for disabling injuries.315
Caldwell challenged the constitutionality of § 39–71–710 in Workers’
Compensation Court (“WCC”).316 He argued that the statute violated equal
protection by prohibiting benefits based solely on the claimant’s eligibility
for Social Security; the WCC agreed.317 The WCC ruled that the statute
treated two similarly situated classes disparately without a reasonable relation to a legitimate government interest.318 MACo appealed the WCC’s
ruling.319
In the majority opinion authored by Justice Morris, the Court began by
articulating the three-step test for equal protection challenges.320 First, the
Court considers whether the statute creates similarly situated classes; second, it determines the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny; and finally, it evaluates the challenge under the appropriate level of scrutiny.321
Here, the parties conceded that the statute “creates two similarly situated classes and treats them differently.”322 The classes consist of claimants who are eligible for Social Security retirement benefits in addition to
their rehabilitation benefits and those who are not.323 The parties also
agreed that rational basis was the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
the statute.324 The parties’ sole dispute was whether the statute passed rational basis review, which requires that it “bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest.”325
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id. at 925 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1006 (2011)).
Id.
Id.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Before analyzing the constitutionality of § 39–71–710, the Court reviewed previous constitutional challenges to the statute.326 In Reesor v.
Montana State Fund, the Court held that denying a claimant PPD benefits
based solely on eligibility for Social Security benefits did not pass rational
basis review.327 But, in Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Company, the Court held that the “age-based elimination of permanent total disability benefits . . . [were] rationally related to the legitimate governmental
interest of providing wage-loss benefits that bear a reasonable relationship
to actual wages lost.”328 The difference is that Montana law limits PPD
benefits to a period of 375 weeks and to a percentage of a worker’s lost
wages, whereas PTD benefits are paid for the duration of the worker’s disability.329 The Satterlee Court concluded that because PTD benefits could
turn into a lifetime benefit when their purpose is to assist the worker over
his work life, § 39–71–710 was a rational way to limit the benefit; therefore, it passed constitutional review.330 The Satterlee Court did not overturn Reesor, rather it concluded that the benefits were too different to be
analyzed in the same way.331 Caldwell presented a challenge to the third
type of benefit barred to workers classified as retired under § 39–71–710:
rehabilitation benefits.332
Applying rational basis review, the Court first noted that like PPD benefits, rehabilitation benefits are limited to a set number of weeks.333 Therefore, there is no risk that rehabilitation benefits could become a lifetime
benefit, as was the concern in Satterlee with PTD benefits.334 The Court
then analyzed whether there is a legitimate governmental interest rationally
related to the elimination of the rehabilitation benefits.335 The Court noted
that although cost containment of the workers’ compensation system is a
legitimate governmental interest, it cannot be the only reason for disparate
treatment.336
The Court summed up the arguments of MACo and amicus Montana
State Fund (“MSF”) as follows:
MACo argues that the legislature has a legitimate interest in (1) creating a
wage replacement system, (2) assisting the worker at a reasonable cost to the
employer, (3) controlling the costs of the workers’ compensation program in
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 926–927.
Reesor v. Mont. St. Fund, 103 P.3d 1019, 1024 (Mont. 2004).
Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 222 P.3d 566, 574 (Mont. 2009).
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 927 (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39–71–703 and 39–71–702(1)).
Id. at 927–928 (citing Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 573–574).
Satterlee, 222 P.3d at 573.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 925.
Id. at 928 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–1006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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order to continue providing benefits, and (4) avoiding duplication or overlapping of benefits. Amicus MSF adds that the legislature has a legitimate interest in (5) providing wage-loss benefits that bear a reasonable relationship to
actual wages lost, (6) creating reasonably constant rates for employers, and
(7) tailoring benefit entitlement to need.337

In response to each argument, the Court determined that most of the interests were not separate from the overall issue of cost-containment.338 Additionally, the Court stressed that rehabilitation benefits serve an entirely separate purpose from Social Security benefits, and therefore there is no duplication of benefits for Social Security-eligible claimants.339 The Court also
rejected MACo and MSF’s underlying argument that older workers do not
deserve rehabilitation because they are not a good investment.340
In conclusion, the Court agreed with the WCC’s determination that the
elimination of rehabilitation benefits in § 39–71–710 does not rationally
relate to any legitimate governmental interest and is therefore unconstitutional.341 It noted that eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits
turns solely on age, not whether a worker is able or willing to return to
work (the purpose of rehabilitation benefits).342
Justice Beth Baker dissented from the majority, finding that, like Satterlee, the challenged statute “rationally advances the governmental purpose
of providing wage-loss benefits that bear a reasonable relationship to actual
wages lost.”343 The dissent found that it is rational to withhold benefits
from older workers because “statistically speaking” most people’s work life
ends upon eligibility for Social Security.344 In response, the majority declared that “the statistical majority holds no monopoly on equal protection
guarantees”345
The Montana practitioner should take note of Caldwell and the Court’s
analysis of Montana Code Annotated § 39–71–710 under rational basis review. Caldwell held that the statute was unconstitutional for violating equal
protection by denying rehabilitation benefits to workers eligible for Social
Security retirement benefits. The Court rejected that cost on its own is a
legitimate governmental interest, and concluded that there is no rational basis for denying such benefits to workers eligible for Social Security.
—Amy McNulty
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 929.
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 929.
Id. at 929–930.
Id. at 930.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id. at 933 (Baker, J., dissenting).
Caldwell, 256 P.3d at 933.
Id. at 930 (majority).
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FLYNN V. MONTANA STATE FUND346

On November 29, 2011, the Montana Supreme Court issued Flynn v.
Montana State Fund (“Flynn III”), its third opinion on a workers’ compensation case brought by Robert Flynn.347 The Court’s latest decision clarifies the retroactive application of judicial decisions to workers’ compensation cases.348 Previous cases held that new judicial decisions would be applied retroactively to pending cases, but not to those already “final or
settled.”349 A settled claim is “a department-approved or court-ordered
compromise of benefits between a claimant and an insurer or a claim that
was paid in full.”350 Flynn III clarifies the meaning of “paid in full” by
affirming the Workers’ Compensation Court’s (“WCC”) determination that
a claim is settled when all scheduled benefits have been paid prior to the
new judicial decision.351
Robert Flynn was diagnosed as being totally disabled in 1993 due to
an occupational disease.352 He filed a claim with State Fund, which accepted his claim and paid him benefits.353 Flynn also filed a claim with
Social Security seeking disability benefits.354 A judge retroactively
awarded Flynn Social Security benefits.355 In response to Flynn’s receipt of
Social Security benefits, State Fund reduced its own payments and applied
an offset to compensate for prior over-payments caused by the retroactive
application of Social Security benefits.356 In Flynn v. State Compensation
Insurance Fund (“Flynn I”), the Court determined that State Fund must
contribute proportionally to the litigation costs of a claimant who secures
Social Security benefits that reduce State Fund’s liability.357
In Flynn III, both Flynn and State Fund challenged the WCC definition
of “paid in full” for purposes of determining retroactive application of judicial decisions.358 The WCC determined that a claim paid in full is:
A claim in which all benefits to which a claimant is entitled[,] pursuant to the
statutes applicable to that claim, are paid prior to the issuance of a judicial
decision. If any benefits are paid on the claim after the issuance of a judicial
346. Flynn v. Mont. St. Fund, 267 P.3d 23 (Mont. 2011) [hereinafter Flynn III].
347. Id. at 24.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 24, 25.
350. Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting Flynn v. Mont. St. Fund, 197 P.3d 1007, 1009 (Mont. 2008)
[hereinafter Flynn II].
351. Flynn III, 267 P.3d at 25.
352. Flynn v. St. Compen. Ins. Fund, 60 P.3d 397, 398 (Mont. 2002) [hereinafter Flynn I].
353. Id. at 398.
354. Id. at 399.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 400.
358. Flynn III, 267 P.3d at 24, 27.
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decision, the claim can no longer be considered “paid in full” and is subject to
retroactive application of the judicial decision.359

Flynn objected to the first sentence of this standard and appealed the determination that his claim was “paid in full” once all benefits to which he was
entitled were paid.360 State Fund objected to the second sentence and appealed the determination that a claim could be reopened if any benefits
were paid after a judicial decision.361
Flynn argued that his claim should not be considered “paid in full”
because he retained the right to seek future benefits.362 He argued that a
claim may be inactive when all scheduled payments are made, but that it is
not “paid in full” because the claimant may still receive future compensation under Montana Code Annotated § 39–71–739 if the disability becomes
aggravated.363 Therefore, a claim is only “paid in full” when it is the subject of a judgment or settlement.364 The Court rejected this theory because
the theory failed to recognize the definition of a settled claim under
§ 39–71–107(7)(a) which states that “‘settled claim’ means a departmentapproved or court-ordered compromise of benefits between a claimant and
an insurer or a claim that was paid in full.”365 The Court explained that
under Flynn’s theory, no claim could be paid in full unless it qualified
under the first part of the definition, thus the inclusion of the phrase “paid in
full” would have no independent significance.366 Instead, the Court interpreted the law to give significance to all the statutory language.367
State Fund argued that the WCC decision undermined the finality of
the “paid in full” standard by allowing a previously finalized claim to become “un-finalized,” thus creating uncertainty in the claims process.368 The
Court rejected that argument because, under § 39–71–739 and its prior decision in Flynn v. Montana State Fund (“Flynn II”), a claim is not considered final if it is adjusted due to an aggravation of the disability.369 Furthermore, the Court distinguished a case that is “closed” or “inactive” from one
that is “final or settled.”370
359. Id. at 25 (brackets in original) (quoting Or. Re: Paid in Full, Flynn v. Mont. St. Fund, 2010
MTWCC 20, ¶ 1 (July 1, 2010).
360. Id. at 25–26.
361. Id. at 27.
362. Id. at 26.
363. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–739 (2011).
364. Flynn III, 267 P.3d at 26–27.
365. Id. at 26; Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–107(7)(a) (2005) (recodified as Mont. Code Ann.
§ 39–71–107(10)(a)).
366. Flynn III, 267 P.3d at 26.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 27.
369. Id.; Flynn II, 197 P.3d at 1012.
370. Flynn III, 267 P.3d at 27.
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The Court acknowledged that “[t]he workers’ compensation system is
by nature open-ended.”371 Nevertheless, it reasoned it must apply some
standard of finality to workers’ compensation cases.372 The Court affirmed
the WCC decision which “properly gives credit to the necessary balance
between finality and fairness.”373 In particular, the Court agreed that “‘it is
the actual payment of benefits, as opposed to the potential payment of benefits, that renders a claim no longer ‘paid in full,’ and subject to retroactive
application of Flynn I.’”374 Thus, the existence of actual payment is controlling for both the claimant and State Fund. Where it is lacking, the
claimant cannot seek the application of a new judicial standard; where it is
present, State Fund is subject to new judicial standards, even if the claim
had previously been classified as finalized.
Flynn III solidifies the determination of the WCC that a workers’ compensation claim will be considered paid in full if and only if there are no
further actual payments on the claim. This rule applies a clear standard to
determine when new judicial decisions will apply to old claims; however,
that standard is fluid because a claim’s finality may be temporary. Even
Flynn’s much litigated claim may yet be subject to subsequent judicial decisions if a change in circumstances requires State Fund to make additional
payments to Flynn. Thus, Montana practitioners in workers’ compensation
should be aware that retroactivity does not apply to claims that have been
fully paid, but that any new payments on a previously finalized claim will
open that claim to retroactive application of judicial decisions.
—Samuel Preta
X.

LAMPI V. SPEED375

Before the Montana Supreme Court decided Sunburst School District
No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.376 in 2007, plaintiffs whose property was damaged
were limited to diminution in market value as compensation.377 In Sunburst, the Court made a substantial shift in its jurisprudence by “rejecting a
one-size-fits-all approach to property damages”378 and adopting § 929 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which, in addition to diminution in market value damages, also allows for restoration damages in “appropriate
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27 (emphasis in original) (quoting Or. Re: Paid in Full, ¶ 9).
Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000 (Mont. 2011).
Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004 (citing Burk Ranches, Inc. v. Mont., 790 P.2d 443, 445 (Mont. 1990)).
Id. at 1004.
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cases.”379 In Lampi v. Speed, the Montana Supreme Court applied the Sunburst restoration damages rule for the first time.380 The Lampi decision
clarified the elements a plaintiff must establish to receive restoration damages and demonstrated that restoration damages may be applied in circumstances besides the toxic contamination seen in Sunburst.
The case arose from a fire that burned much of Rohnn Lampi’s property in Red Lodge, Montana.381 Lampi purchased the forty acres as a vacation and retirement home because of “its aesthetic beauty and wild setting,”
rather than for investment purposes.382 He especially liked an aspen grove
behind his home “that provided shade, privacy, and wildlife viewing.”383
Lampi’s neighbor, Allen Speed, admitted he negligently dumped ashes,
causing a wildfire that burned Lampi’s property.384 Although firefighters
saved Lampi’s house, the fire extensively damaged the rest of the property,
killing hundreds of pine and aspen trees.385 Lampi testified that he wanted
to take all available measures to restore his property and he hoped to one
day pass the land to his children and grandchildren.386
Because Speed admitted liability for the fire, the only issue in the case
was the measure of Lampi’s damages.387 Lampi filed several motions, including two motions for summary judgment, seeking to establish restoration
damages as the correct measure of damages.388 But the district court denied
the motions.389 At trial, experts for Lampi and Speed disagreed on the
amount required to restore the property. Lampi’s restoration expert estimated it would cost $1,050,000, while Speed’s estimated it would cost
roughly $550,000.390 Additionally, Speed’s property expert testified that
the property value diminished by $193,800 as a result of the fire.391 The
district court gave the jury two alternative instructions regarding damages.392 The first said the jury could award the diminution in market value
resulting from the fire as damages.393 The second said the jury could award
restoration damages if the jury found that diminution in market value failed
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 1004–1005.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002–1003.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1002.
Id. at 1002–1003.
Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id.
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to “fully compensate the plaintiff.”394 Without specifying whether the damages were due to diminution in value or restoration damages, the jury
awarded Lampi $250,000.395 Lampi appealed the award.396
On appeal, the parties’ arguments focused on their interpretations of
the restoration damages rule from Sunburst.397 Speed argued that restoration damages should only apply to toxic contamination, like in Sunburst, or
similar situations where the injury could not naturally restore itself.398 He
argued that the Court should instead apply Kebschull v. Nott,399 which said
diminution in market value was the correct measure of damages for vegetation destroyed by fire.400 The Court quickly dismissed Speed’s argument,
saying Kebschull was inapplicable because it predated the adoption of restoration damages in Sunburst.401 Lampi argued that, based on his interpretation of Sunburst, he should receive restoration damages as a matter of law
because he established four elements: (1) he suffered a temporary injury;
(2) he had “reasons personal” to restore the property; (3) he genuinely intended to restore the property; and (4) restoration costs were not disproportionate to the value of the property.402 The Montana Supreme Court also
rejected Lampi’s interpretation of the requirements for restoration damages
and further refined the Sunburst rule.403
The Sunburst Court adopted § 929 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, in the context of toxic contamination in Sunburst, Montana.404 In
that case, gasoline leaks from a refinery contaminated soil and groundwater
with the carcinogen benzene.405 The contamination essentially rendered the
plaintiffs’ property unsalable.406 The Court recognized that without restoration damages in excess of the diminution in value of the property,
tortfeasors would have little incentive to prevent such contamination and
the Court’s refusal to apply restoration damages would essentially create “a
private right of inverse condemnation.”407 For those reasons, the Sunburst
Court adopted § 929, which allowed a plaintiff to choose between diminution in market value and restoration damages, but only in “appropriate
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1003–1004.
Kebschull v. Nott, 714 P.2d 993 (Mont. 1986).
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1005.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004.
Id.
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case[s].”408 The Court also adopted comment b to § 929, which clarifies
what qualifies as an appropriate case.409 Although the Court acknowledged
that comment b only requires a reason personal if the restoration costs are
“disproportionate to the diminution in value,”410 it adopted a simplified rule
requiring temporary damage and reasons personal to the plaintiff to award
restoration damages in all circumstances.411
The Court definitively rejected Lampi’s four-element interpretation of
Sunburst’s restoration damages rule, and instead adopted a two-element
rule construction.412 The Court held a plaintiff must establish that his injury was temporary and he had reasons personal to restore the property to
receive restoration damages.413 The Court recognized that Lampi’s suggested “genuine intent to restore property” element was incorporated into
the reasons personal analysis because “[t]he reasons personal analysis requires plaintiff to establish that the award actually will be used for restoration.”414 Yet the Court failed to discuss Lampi’s suggested fourth element,
which would have required restoration costs not be disproportionate to the
land values.415
After setting out the two elements required for restoration damages,
the Court analyzed whether Lampi satisfied those elements in his summary
judgment motion. The Court first found that Lampi had established that the
fire damage to his property qualified as a temporary (restorable) injury.416
An injury is temporary if the injury would disappear after remediation is
completed or the tortfeasor could restore the property to substantially its
original condition.417 The Court noted cases from four other jurisdictions—
Alaska, California, New Jersey and Maryland—had held damage to trees
could be restored and is therefore a temporary injury.418 Importantly,
Speed acknowledged that the damaged trees “eventually would regenerate
over time with minimal restoration efforts.”419 Thus, Speed implicitly recognized that damage to trees could be restored, establishing the injury was
temporary.420
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 1004–1005.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1006.
See id. (not mentioning proportionality of damages).
Id.
Id.
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1006.
Id.
Id.
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The Court also found that Lampi had presented enough evidence to
establish he had reasons personal to him for restoring the property.421 Restoration damages are generally the most appropriate measure of damages
for landowners who desire to continue to use the damaged property rather
than sell it. They are inappropriate damages, however, for plaintiffs who
own property merely as an investment because restoration damages would
provide a cash windfall.422 The Court examined three cases from other jurisdictions that found the plaintiff had a reason personal to restore the property,423 including the Alaska case Osborne v. Hurst.424 In that case, the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed a trial court decision holding diminution in
market value was the appropriate measure of damages because the plaintiffs’ trees had noncommercial value and the plaintiffs had chosen the property as a place to retire because of its wooded character.425 Relying on
those cases, the Court ruled that Lampi established his reasons personal
though his testimony that he had selected the property for its vegetation, he
never intended to sell the property, and he intended to retire on the property.426
Although the Court pointed out that these are normally questions of
fact, it determined that Speed had failed to show there was a dispute of
material fact regarding either whether the injury was temporary or whether
Lampi had a reason personal to desire to restore the property.427 The Court
presumed Speed made a tactical decision to contest the applicability of restoration damages, rather than present factual evidence disputing the elements necessary to grant restoration damages.428 Because there were no
material issues of fact, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the restoration damages issue and remanded the case for
a new trial in which the jury could decide a reasonable amount of restoration damages.429
In Lampi, the Montana Supreme Court clarified the requirements for
an award of restoration damages. For a plaintiff to receive restoration damages, the plaintiff must establish that he suffered a temporary, or restorable,
injury and that he had a reason personal to him to restore the property to its
pre-injury state. Montana practitioners should regard Lampi as the first application of the Sunburst doctrine beyond toxic contamination and a clear
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1007–1008.
Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1997).
Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1007–1008.
Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
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articulation of the elements of the restoration damages doctrine. Yet Lampi
did not address how the proportionality of restoration damages and diminution in value affects the applicability of the doctrine, so practitioners should
also be aware that the Court may make further refinements to the doctrine
in the future.
—Gale Price
XI.

STATE V. DANIELS430

In State v. Daniels, a deliberate homicide case, the Montana Supreme
Court discussed the effect of legislation passed by the 2009 Montana Legislature on the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force and the foundational requirements for the admission of character evidence of a victim.431
The Court concluded that justifiable use of force still operates as an affirmative defense, and that a defendant must lay a proper foundation for character evidence in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Evidence
and Montana caselaw.432
The case arose when Larry Daniels and his son, Buddy Daniels, became embroiled in a family argument at their shared residence.433 The
Daniels family consisted of four members: Larry Daniels (“Daniels”), Daniels’s son Buddy, Daniels’s son Logan, and Buddy’s son Hagen.434 The
family lived in Fromberg, Montana, on property that included a main house
where Buddy, Logan, and Hagen lived and an apartment and attached shop
where Daniels lived.435 On May 21, 2009, Daniels and Buddy became intoxicated and started fighting.436 Daniels refused to leave the main house
until Buddy physically removed him.437 Buddy followed Daniels to his
apartment.438 Logan and Hagen also followed but did not witness the
events inside.439
Once home, Daniels got a beer and took his .22 pistol out of its holster.440 Buddy entered the apartment and challenged Daniels.441 Daniels
told him to leave; when Buddy refused and moved toward him, Daniels
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

State v. Daniels, 265 P.3d 623 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 628–630, 633.
Id.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626–627.
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pulled the trigger “to protect [himself].”442 Daniels told police that he was
ten feet from Buddy when he fired three shots and that “[a]nytime you pick
up a gun and you pop a cap, your intent is to kill.”443 The police arrested
Daniels at the scene.444
The State charged Daniels with deliberate homicide and alternatively
with mitigated deliberate homicide.445 Daniels pleaded not guilty, and he
gave notice of his intention to rely on the defense of justifiable use of
force.446 The State filed a motion in limine to prevent Daniels from mentioning Buddy’s alleged character for violence until Daniels laid a proper
foundation.447 According to Montana law, a proper foundation would include the defendant’s testimony that “he knew he was shooting [the victim],
that he knew of [the victim’s] past violent conduct, and that his knowledge
of this conduct led him to use the level of force he did.”448 Daniels sought
an order excluding any argument by the prosecution shifting the burden of
proof regarding an element of the charged offense to Daniels.449 The district court issued preliminary rulings and deferred final rulings until trial.450
After a six-day trial, the jury found Daniels guilty of deliberate homicide,
and the district court sentenced Daniels to sixty years in prison.451 Daniels
appealed his conviction.452
The Court first addressed the effect of the 2009 legislation on the defense of justifiable use of force.453 The stated purpose of House Bill 228
was to “preserve[ ] and clarify[ ] laws relating to the right of self-defense
and the right to bear arms.”454 Previously, the State’s burden of proof did
not require proving the absence of justification.455 House Bill 228, however, included a provision (since codified) requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s actions were not justified whenever a defendant in a criminal trial offers evidence of justifiable use of
force.456 According to Daniels, House Bill 228 reversed the rule that justifiable use of force is an affirmative defense.457 An affirmative defense is
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Daniels, 265 P.3d at 627.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 633 (citing State v. Montgomery, 112 P.3d 1014, 1018 (Mont. 2005)).
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628–629.
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 629.
Id.
Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–131 (2011).
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 629.
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defined as a defense that “admits the doing of the act charged, but seeks to
justify, excuse or mitigate it.”458
The Court rejected Daniels’ argument as “overstat[ing] the effect of
the legislation” because House Bill 228 did not amend the Montana Code
Annotated provision explicitly naming justifiable use of force an affirmative defense.459 The Court said that “while the Legislature provided that the
burden of proof can ultimately be shifted to the State,” justifiable use of
force still operates as an affirmative defense.460 This means that the initial
burden of evidence production is on the defendant.461 The Court determined that Daniels did not satisfy this initial burden by simply providing
pre-trial notice of his intention to rely on justifiable use of force as a defense.462
The second important issue in Daniels was the necessary foundation
for admission of evidence of the victim’s character.463 Daniels argued that
the district court erred in ruling that his testimony was necessary to lay the
foundation for admission of Buddy’s character evidence.464 He argued that
House Bill 228 had overruled the caselaw requiring a defendant’s testimony.465 The Court, however, upheld the foundational requirements for
admission of character evidence of a victim.466 Though the Court acknowledged that House Bill 228 shifted the burden to the prosecution to prove
absence of justification, “this burden does not eliminate the need to satisfy
foundational requirements for the admissibility of evidence pursuant to the
Rules of Evidence.”467 Thus, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
that Daniels’s testimony was necessary to lay a foundation for the evidence;
Daniels did not provide such testimony.468
The Court also rejected Daniels’ constitutional argument that the lower
court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by requiring him
to lay the foundation for his justification evidence.469 The record did not
contain any references to the Fifth Amendment as it related to Daniels’
argument on appeal.470 The Court determined that Daniels’ willingness to
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 629–630.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 635.
Id.
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testify precluded his ability to object on appeal.471 Though the Fifth
Amendment argument was not applicable in this case, lawyers could raise it
in the future since there is clearly tension between the right to remain silent
and the requirement to testify.
This case is important for Montana practitioners because it clarifies the
foundation required for admission of evidence of a victim’s character and
the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force.
Though the 2009 Montana Legislature did require that the State prove the
absence of justifiable use of force, the impact of House Bill 228 was not as
sweeping as Daniels asserted; a defendant must still offer the proper foundation for evidence of character of the victim and must produce the initial
evidence for the justifiable use of force defense.
—Hannah Tokerud

471. Id.
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